

Two is the fastest prime

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Abstract. In this work we present the λ -coordinates, a new system for representing points in binary elliptic curves. We also provide efficient elliptic curve operations based on the new representation and timing results of our software implementation over the field $\mathbb{F}_{2^{254}}$. As a result, we improved the known speed records for protected/unprotected single/multi-core software implementations of the random-point elliptic curve scalar multiplication at the 128-bit security level. When implemented on a Sandy Bridge 3.4GHz Intel Xeon processor, our software is able to compute a single/multi-core unprotected scalar multiplication in 72,300 and 47,900 clock cycles, respectively; and a protected single-core scalar multiplication in 114,800 cycles. These numbers improve by 2% on the newer Ivy Bridge platform.

1 Introduction

The introduction in contemporary processor micro-architectures of a native carry-less multiplier and vector instruction sets, such as SSE and AVX, has brought a renewed interest to the study of efficient software implementations of scalar multiplication in elliptic curves defined over binary fields [40, 5, 4]. From the algorithmic point of view, one of the single most important aspects to accelerate the computation of the scalar multiplication is the point representation. In this respect, the relatively expensive cost of field inversions associated to the arithmetic of affine point representation motivated the creation of different projective coordinate systems.

In the case of binary curves, one of the first proposals was the homogeneous projective coordinates system [1], which represents an affine point $P = (x, y)$ as the triplet (X, Y, Z) , where $x = \frac{X}{Z}$ and $y = \frac{Y}{Z}$, whereas in the Jacobian coordinate system [11], the choice $x = \frac{X}{Z^2}$ and $y = \frac{Y}{Z^3}$, was selected. In 1998, López-Dahab (LD) coordinates [35] were proposed using $x = \frac{X}{Z}$ and $y = \frac{Y}{Z^2}$. Since then, LD coordinates have become the most studied coordinate system for binary elliptic curves, with many authors [28, 32, 3, 31, 8] contributing to improve

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their performance. In 2007, Kim and Kim [27] presented a four dimensional LD coordinate system that represents P as (X, Y, Z, T^2) , with $x = \frac{X}{Z}$, $y = \frac{Y}{T}$ and $T = Z^2$. In a different vein, Bernstein *et al.* introduced in [8] a set of complete formulas for binary Edwards elliptic curves.

Among the works studying scalar multiplication over binary elliptic curves, the authors in [40] were the first to analyze the impact of using the carry-less multiplier in the computation of the scalar multiplication over Koblitz and generic curves at security of 112, 128 and 192 bits. This work also presented multi-core implementations of their algorithms based on the parallel formulations first given in [2]. The authors in [4] hold the record for the fastest unprotected implementation of scalar multiplication at the 128-bit security level by employing the NIST-K283 curve, where a simple analogue of the 2-dimensional GLV method was used. This record was almost immediately broken in [33, 34], where the authors merged the GLS and GLV methods to achieve a 4-dimensional decomposition of scalars in a non-standardized Twisted Edwards prime curve. For protected curves, authors in [9] held the speed record in a genus-2 elliptic curve.

Our contributions. This work further contributes to the advances in binary elliptic curves by presenting a new projective coordinate system and its corresponding group law, which is based on the λ -representation of a point $P = (x, \lambda)$, where $\lambda = x + \frac{y}{x}$. The efficient group law enables significant speedups in the pre/postcomputation and the main loop of the traditional double-and-add and halve-and-add scalar multiplication methods. The concrete application of λ -coordinates to the 2-dimensional GLS-GLV method combined with efficient quadratic field arithmetic allow us to claim the speed records at the 128-bit security level for single and multi-core unprotected scalar multiplication, improving by 20% and 21% the timings reported in Longa and Sica [33, 34], respectively. For protected single-core scalar multiplication, we improved by 17% and 4% the timings reported in [34, 9], respectively.¹

2 Binary Field Arithmetic

A binary extension field \mathbb{F}_{2^m} of order $q = 2^m$ can be constructed by taking an m -degree polynomial $f(x) \in \mathbb{F}_2[x]$ irreducible over \mathbb{F}_2 . The \mathbb{F}_{2^m} field is isomorphic to $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/(f(x))$ and its elements consist of the collection of binary polynomials of degree less than m . Quadratic extensions of a binary extension field can be built using a monic polynomial $g(u) \in \mathbb{F}_2[u]$ of degree two that happens to be irreducible over \mathbb{F}_q . In this case, the field \mathbb{F}_{q^2} is isomorphic to $\mathbb{F}_q[u]/(g(u))$ and its elements can be represented as $a + bu$, with $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_q$. In this paper, we developed an efficient field arithmetic library for the tower of the fields \mathbb{F}_q and its quadratic extension \mathbb{F}_{q^2} , with $m = 127$, which were constructed by

¹ The benchmarking was run on Intel platforms Xeon E31270 3.4GHz and Core i5 3570 3.4GHz. Our library will be submitted to the ECRYPT Benchmarking of Asymmetric Systems (eBATS) in the near future.

means of the irreducible trinomials $f(x) = x^{127} + x^{63} + 1$ and $g(u) = u^2 + u + 1$, respectively.

Given two field elements $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_q$, field multiplication can be performed by polynomial multiplication followed by modular reduction as, $c = a \cdot b \bmod f(x)$. Since the binary coefficients of the base field elements \mathbb{F}_q can be packed as vectors of two 64-bit words, the usage of the standard Karatsuba method allows us to compute the polynomial multiplication step at a cost of three 64-bit products (equivalent to three carry-less multiplication instruction invocations [40]), and some additions. Due to the very special form of $f(x)$, modular reduction is especially pleasant as it can be accomplished using essentially additions and shifts (the algorithm can be seen in Appendix A). Multi-squaring, or exponentiation to 2^k , with $k > 5$ was performed via the look-up of per-field constant tables of $2^4 \cdot \lceil \frac{m}{4} \rceil$ elements. Inversions in the base field were carried out using the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm [24]. Solving a quadratic equation in the field over \mathbb{F}_q is done by the half-trace function. It is defined as $H(c) = \sum_{i=0}^{(m-1)/2} c^{2^{2i}}$ and can be computed exploiting its linear property as, $H(c) = H(\sum_{i=0}^{m-1} c_i x^i) = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} c_i H(x^i)$. This allows us to compute the half-trace of a field element c by means of an 8-bit index look-up table of $2^8 \cdot \lceil \frac{m}{8} \rceil$ elements.

Operations in the quadratic extension are performed coefficient-wise. For instance, the multiplication of two elements $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{q^2}$ is performed as, $a \cdot b = (a_0 + a_1 u) \cdot (b_0 + b_1 u) = (a_0 b_0 + a_1 b_1) + (a_0 b_1 + a_1 b_0 + a_1 b_1) u$ with $a_0, a_1, b_0, b_1 \in \mathbb{F}_q$. Squaring a field element is accomplished using the identity, $a^2 = (a_0 + a_1 u)^2 = a_0^2 + a_1^2 + a_1^2 u$. The inverse c of a field element a is given as the solution of the equation $a \cdot c = (a_0 + a_1 u)(c_0 + c_1 u)^{-1} = 1$, which can be computed using the formulas $t = a_0 a_1 + a_0^2 + a_1^2$, $c_0 = (a_0 + a_1) t^{-1}$ and $c_1 = a_1 t^{-1}$. Solving quadratic equations of the form $x^2 + x = c$ with $Tr(c) = 0$ in \mathbb{F}_{q^2} can be reduced to the solution of two quadratic equations over \mathbb{F}_q , as discussed in [19].

The costs of the quadratic extension arithmetic in terms of its base field operations are presented in Table 1. Throughout this paper, we denote by $(a_b, m_b, q_b, s_b, i_b, h_b, t_b)$ and $(\tilde{a}, \tilde{m}, \tilde{q}, \tilde{s}, \tilde{i}, \tilde{h}, \tilde{t})$ the computational costs of the addition, multiplication, square-root, squaring, inversion, half-trace and trace operations over \mathbb{F}_q and \mathbb{F}_{q^2} , respectively.

Table 1. Operation counts for the arithmetic on the field $\mathbb{F}_{q^2} \cong \mathbb{F}_q[u]/(u^2 + u + 1)$

Multiplication (\tilde{m})	Square-Root (\tilde{q})	Squaring (\tilde{s})	Inversion (\tilde{i})	Half-Trace (\tilde{h})
$3m_b + 4a_b$	$2q_b + a_b$	$2s_b + a_b$	$i_b + 3m_b + 3a_b$	$2h_b + t_b + 2a_b$

3 Binary elliptic curves

The Weierstrass form of a binary ordinary elliptic curve defined over \mathbb{F}_q , $q = 2^m$, is given by the equation $E/\mathbb{F}_q : y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$, with $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_q$ and $b \neq 0$. The set of points $P = (x, y)$ with $x, y \in \mathbb{F}_q$ that satisfy the above equation,

together with the point at infinity \mathcal{O} , form an additive abelian group with respect to the elliptic point addition operation. This group is denoted as $E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F}_q)$. The j -invariant $j(E)$ of an elliptic curve E is given as: $j(E) = -1728 \frac{4a^3}{4a^3 + 27b^2}$. Any two non-isomorphic curves defined over an extension field \mathbb{F}_q having the same j -invariant are called *twists* of each other. The number of points on the curve is denoted as $\#E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F}_q)$, and the integer $t = q + 1 - \#E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F}_q)$, known as the trace of Frobenius, satisfies $|t| \leq 2\sqrt{q}$.

Let $\langle P \rangle$ be an additively written subgroup in $E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F}_q)$ of prime order r , and let k be a positive integer such that $k \in [0, r - 1]$. Then, the elliptic curve scalar multiplication operation computes the multiple $Q = kP$, which corresponds to adding P to itself $k - 1$ times. The average cost of computing kP by a random n -bit scalar k using the customary double-and-add method is of about $nD + \frac{n}{2}A$, where D is the cost of doubling a point (i.e. the operation of computing $R = 2P = S + S$, with $S \in \langle P \rangle$) and A is the cost of a point addition (i.e. the operation of computing $R = S + T$, with $S, T \in \langle P \rangle$). Given r, P and $Q \in \langle P \rangle$, the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) consists of finding the unique integer k such that $Q = kP$ holds.

In order to have a more efficient elliptic curve arithmetic, it is standard to use a projective version of the elliptic curve equation where the points are represented in the so-called projective space. The following subsection describes the λ -projective coordinates, a new coordinate system whose associated group law is introduced here for the first time.

3.1 Group law for Lambda projective coordinates

Given a point $P = (x, y) \in E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F}_q)$ with $x \neq 0$, the λ -affine representation [13, 35–37] of P is defined as (x, λ) , where $\lambda = x + \frac{y}{x}$. The λ -projective point $P = (X, L, Z)$ corresponds to the λ -affine point $(\frac{X}{Z}, \frac{L}{Z})$. The λ -projective equation form of the Weierstrass equation is

$$(L^2 + LZ + aZ^2)X^2 = X^4 + bZ^4.$$

Next, we present the formulas for point doubling and addition in the λ -projective coordinate system. Complementary formulas and complete proofs of all theorems can be found in Appendix B.

Theorem 1. *Let $P = (X_P, L_P, Z_P)$ be a point in a non-supersingular curve $E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F}_q)$. Then the formula for $2P = (X_{2P}, L_{2P}, Z_{2P})$ using the λ -projective representation is given by*

$$\begin{aligned} T &= L_P^2 + (L_P \cdot Z_P) + a \cdot Z_P^2 \\ X_{2P} &= T^2 \\ Z_{2P} &= T \cdot Z_P^2 \\ L_{2P} &= (X_P \cdot Z_P)^2 + X_{2P} + T \cdot (L_P \cdot Z_P) + Z_{2P}. \end{aligned}$$

For situations where the multiplication by the b-coefficient is fast one can replace one full multiplication with the constant multiplication by $a^2 + b$. We present below an alternative formula for calculating L_{2P} :

$$L_{2P} = (L_P + X_P)^2 \cdot ((L_P + X_P)^2 + T + Z_P^2) + (a^2 + b) \cdot Z_P^4 + X_{2P} + (a + 1) \cdot Z_{2P}.$$

Theorem 2. *Let $P = (X_P, L_P, Z_P)$ and $Q = (X_Q, L_Q, Z_Q)$ be points in $E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F}_q)$ with $P \neq \pm Q$. Then the addition $P + Q = (X_{P+Q}, L_{P+Q}, Z_{P+Q})$ can be computed by the formulas*

$$\begin{aligned} A &= L_P \cdot Z_Q + L_Q \cdot Z_P \\ B &= (X_P \cdot Z_Q + X_Q + Z_P)^2 \\ X_{P+Q} &= A \cdot (X_P \cdot Z_Q) \cdot (X_Q \cdot Z_P) \cdot A \\ L_{P+Q} &= (A \cdot (X_Q \cdot Z_P) + B)^2 + (A \cdot B \cdot Z_Q) \cdot (L_P + Z_P) \\ Z_{P+Q} &= (A \cdot B \cdot Z_Q) \cdot Z_P. \end{aligned}$$

Furthermore, we derive an efficient formula for computing the operation $2Q + P$, with the points Q and P represented in λ -projective and λ -affine coordinates, respectively.

Theorem 3. *Let $P = (x_P, \lambda_P)$ and $Q = (X_Q, L_Q, Z_Q)$ be points in the curve $E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F}_q)$. Then the operation $2Q + P = (X_{2Q+P}, L_{2Q+P}, Z_{2Q+P})$ can be computed as follows:*

$$\begin{aligned} T &= L_Q^2 + L_Q \cdot Z_Q + a \cdot Z_Q^2 \\ A &= X_Q^2 \cdot Z_Q^2 + T \cdot (L_Q^2 + (a + 1 + \lambda_P) \cdot Z_Q^2) \\ B &= (x_P \cdot Z_Q^2 + T)^2 \\ X_{2Q+P} &= (x_P \cdot Z_Q^2) \cdot A^2 \\ Z_{2Q+P} &= (A \cdot B \cdot Z_Q^2) \\ L_{2Q+P} &= T \cdot (A + B)^2 + (\lambda_P + 1) \cdot Z_{2Q+P}. \end{aligned}$$

Table 2 summarizes the costs of the following point operations when using the λ -projective coordinate system in an elliptic curve defined over the quadratic field E/\mathbb{F}_{q^2} , full-addition $R = P + Q$, mixed-addition $R = P + Q$ with P represented in λ -affine coordinates, doubling $R = 2P$, and doubling and addition $R = 2Q + P$ with P represented in λ -affine coordinates. The terms \tilde{m}_a and \tilde{m}_b denote the field multiplication by the curve constants a and b , respectively. For comparison purposes, the cost of these operations when using the López-Dahab (LD) projective coordinate system [35] is also included.

3.2 GLS curves

In 2001, Gallant, Lambert and Vanstone (GLV) [15] presented a technique that uses efficient computable endomorphisms available in certain classes of elliptic

Table 2. Operation counts for point addition and doubling on E/\mathbb{F}_{q^2}

Coordinate system	Full-addition	Mixed-addition	Doubling	Doubling and addition
López-Dahab	$13\tilde{m} + 4\tilde{s}$	$8\tilde{m} + 1\tilde{m}_a + 5\tilde{s}$	$3\tilde{m} + 1\tilde{m}_a + 1\tilde{m}_b + 5\tilde{s}$	n/a
Lambda	$11\tilde{m} + 2\tilde{s}$	$8\tilde{m} + 2\tilde{s}$	$\frac{4\tilde{m} + 1\tilde{m}_a + 4\tilde{s}}{3\tilde{m} + 1\tilde{m}_a + \tilde{m}_b + 4\tilde{s}}$	$10\tilde{m} + 1\tilde{m}_a + 6\tilde{s}$

curves that allows for significant speedups in the scalar multiplication computation. Later, Galbraith, Lin and Scott (GLS) [14] constructed efficient endomorphisms for a broader class of elliptic curves defined over \mathbb{F}_{q^2} , where q is a prime number, showing that the GLV technique also applies to these curves. Subsequently, Hankerson, Karabina and Menezes investigated in [19] the feasibility of implementing the GLS curves over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{2m}}$. In the next paragraphs, we introduce the GLS curves over binary fields and its endomorphism. Our description closely follows the one given in [19].

Let $q = 2^m$ and let $E/\mathbb{F}_q : y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$, with $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_q$, be a binary elliptic curve. Also, pick a field element $a' \in \mathbb{F}_{q^2}$ such that $Tr(a') = 1$, where Tr is the trace function from \mathbb{F}_{q^2} to \mathbb{F}_2 defined as, $Tr : c \mapsto \sum_{i=0}^{2m-1} c^{2^i}$. Then, define $\tilde{E}/\mathbb{F}_{q^2} : y^2 + xy = x^3 + a'x^2 + b$, with $\#\tilde{E}_{a',b}(\mathbb{F}_{q^2}) = (q-1)^2 + t^2$. It is known that \tilde{E} is the quadratic twist of E , which means that both curves are isomorphic over \mathbb{F}_{q^4} under the following endomorphism [19], $\phi : E \rightarrow \tilde{E}, (x, y) \mapsto (x, y + sx)$, with $s \in \mathbb{F}_{q^4} \setminus \mathbb{F}_{q^2}$ satisfying $s^2 + s = a + a'$. It is also known that the map ϕ is an involution, *i.e.*, $\phi = \phi^{-1}$. Let $\pi : E \rightarrow E$ be the Frobenius map defined as $(x, y) \mapsto (x^{2^m}, y^{2^m})$, and let ψ be the composite endomorphism $\psi = \phi\pi\phi^{-1}$ given as,

$$\psi : \tilde{E} \rightarrow \tilde{E}, \quad (x, y) \mapsto (x^{2^m}, y^{2^m} + s^{2^m} x^{2^m} + s x^{2^m}).$$

In this work, the binary elliptic curve $\tilde{E}_{a',b}(\mathbb{F}_{q^2})$ was defined with the parameters $a' = u$ and $b \in \mathbb{F}_q$, where b was carefully chosen to assure that $\#\tilde{E}_{a',b}(\mathbb{F}_{q^2}) = hr$, with $h = 2$ and where r is a prime of size $2m - 1$ bits. Moreover, $s^{2^m} + s = u$, which implies that the endomorphism ψ acting over the λ -affine point $P = (x_0 + x_1u, \lambda_0 + \lambda_1u) \in \tilde{E}_{a',b}(\mathbb{F}_{q^2})$, can be computed at a cost of only three additions in \mathbb{F}_q as,

$$\psi(P) \mapsto ((x_0 + x_1) + x_1u, (\lambda_0 + \lambda_1) + (\lambda_1 + 1)u).$$

It is worth to remark that in order to prevent the generalized Gaudry-Hess-Smart (gGHS) attack [16, 21], the constant b of $\tilde{E}_{a',b}(\mathbb{F}_{q^2})$ must be carefully verified. However, the probability that a randomly selected $b \in \mathbb{F}_q$ is a weak parameter is negligibly small [19].

4 Scalar Multiplication

In this Section, the most prominent methods for computing the scalar multiplication on Weierstrass binary curves are described. Here, we are specifically interested in the problem of computing the elliptic curve scalar multiplication $Q = kP$, where $P \in \tilde{E}_{a',b}(\mathbb{F}_{q^2})$ is a generator of prime order r and $k \in \mathbb{Z}_r$ is a scalar of bitlength $|k| \approx |r| = 2m - 1$.

4.1 The GLV method and the w -NAF representation

Let ψ be a nontrivial efficiently computable endomorphism of \tilde{E} . Also, let us define the integer $\delta \in [2, r - 1]$ such that $\psi(Q) = \delta Q$, for all $Q \in \tilde{E}_{a',b}(\mathbb{F}_{q^2})$. Computing kP with the GLV method consists of the following steps.

First, a balanced length-two representation of the scalar $k \equiv k_1 + k_2\delta \pmod{r}$, must be found, where $|k_1|, |k_2| \approx |r|/2$. Given k and δ , there exist several methods to find k_1, k_2 [20, 38, 26]. However, we decided to follow the suggestion in [14] which selects two integers k_1, k_2 at random, perform the scalar multiplication and then return $k \equiv k_1 + k_2\delta \pmod{r}$, if required.¹ Having split the scalar k into two parts, the computation of $kP = k_1P + k_2\psi(P)$ can be performed by simultaneous multiple point multiplication techniques [18], in combination with any of the methods to be described next. A further acceleration can be achieved by representing the scalars k_1, k_2 in the width- w non-adjacent form (w -NAF). In this representation, k_j is written as an n -bit string $k_j = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} k_{j,i}2^i$, with $k_{j,i} \in \{0, \pm 1, \dots, \pm 2^{w-1} - 1\}$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$. A w -NAF string has a length $n \leq |k_j| + 1$, at most one nonzero bit among any w consecutive bits, and its average nonzero-bit density is approximately $1/(w + 1)$.

4.2 Left-to-right double-and-add

The computation of the scalar multiplication $kP = k_1P + k_2\psi(P)$ via the traditional left-to-right double-and-add method, can be achieved by splitting the scalar k as described above and representing the scalars k_1, k_2 so obtained in their w -NAF form. The precomputation step is accomplished by calculating the 2^{w-2} multiples $P_i = iP$ for $i \in \{1, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$. For the sake of efficiency, the multiples must be computed in λ -projective form, a task that can be accomplished using the doubling and addition operation described in § 3.1. This is followed by the application of the endomorphism to each point P_i so that the multiples $\psi(P_i)$ are also precomputed and stored. The computational effort associated to the precomputation is: $38\tilde{m} + 2\tilde{m}_a + 8\tilde{s} + 1\tilde{i}$. Thereafter, the accumulator Q is initialized at the point at infinity \mathcal{O} , and the digits $k_{j,i}$ are scanned from left to right one at a time. The accumulator is doubled at each iteration of the main loop and in case that $k_{j,i} \neq 0$, the corresponding precomputed multiple is added to the accumulator as, $Q = Q \pm P_{k'_{j,i}}$. Algorithm 1, with $t = 0$ illustrates the method just described.

¹ We stress that k can be recovered at a very low computational effort. From our experiments, the scalar k could be reconstructed in a price lesser than five \tilde{m} .

Table 3. Operation counts for selected scalar multiplication methods in $\tilde{E}_{a',b}(\mathbb{F}_{q^2})$

		Double-and-add	Halve-and-add
No-GLV	pre/post	$1D + (2^{w-2} - 1)A$	$1D + (2^{w-1} - 2)A$
(LD)	sc. mult.	$\frac{n}{w+1}A + nD$	$\frac{n}{w+1}(A + \tilde{m}) + nH$
2-GLV	pre/post	$1D + (2^{w-2} - 1)A + 2^{w-2}\psi$	$1D + (2^{w-1} - 2)A$
(LD)	sc. mult.	$\frac{n}{w+1}A + \frac{n}{2}D$	$\frac{n}{w+1}(A + \tilde{m}) + \frac{n}{2}H + \frac{n}{2(w+1)}\psi$
2-GLV	pre/post	$1D + (2^{w-2} - 1)A + 2^{w-2}\psi$	$1D + (2^{w-1} - 2)A$
(λ)	sc. mult.	$\frac{(2w+1)n}{2(w+1)^2}DA + \frac{w^2n}{2(w+1)^2}D + \frac{n}{2(w+1)^2}A$	$\frac{n}{w+1}A + \frac{n}{2}H + \frac{n}{2(w+1)}\psi$

4.3 Right-to-left halve-and-add

In the halve-and-add method [29, 39], all point doublings are replaced by an operation operation called point halving. Given a point P , the halving point operation finds R such that $R = 2P$. This operation is faster than point doubling when applied on binary curves with $Tr(a') = 1$, which is the case considered in this paper. Halving a point involves computing a field multiplication, a square-root and solving a quadratic equation of the form $x^2 + x = c$ [13], whose solution can be found by calculating the half-trace of the field element c , as it was discussed in Section 2.

The halve-and-add method is described as follows. First, let us compute $k' \equiv 2^{n-1}k \pmod{r}$, where $|r| = n$. Which implies that, $k \equiv \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} k'_{n-1-i}/2^i + 2k'_n \pmod{r}$ and therefore, $kP = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} k'_{n-1-i}(\frac{1}{2^i}P) + 2k'_nP$. Then, k' is represented in its w -NAF form, and the 2^{w-2} accumulators are initialized as, $Q_i = \mathcal{O}$, for $i \in \{1, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$. Thereafter, each one of the n bits of k' are scanned from right to left. Whenever a digit $k'_i \neq 0$, the point $\pm P$ is added to the accumulator $Q_{k'_i}$, followed by $P = \frac{1}{2}P$, otherwise, only the halving of P is performed. In a final post-processing step, all the accumulators are added as $Q = \sum iQ_i$, for $i \in \{1, 3, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$. This summation can be efficiently accomplished using Knuth's method [30].¹ The algorithm outputs the result as $Q = kP$. Algorithm 1, with $t = n$ shows a two-dimensional GLV halve-and-add method.

Table 3 shows the estimated costs of the scalar multiplication algorithms in terms of point doublings (D), halvings (H), additions (A), Doubling and additions (DA) and endomorphisms (ψ) when performing the scalar multiplication in the curve $\tilde{E}_{a',b}(\mathbb{F}_{q^2})$.

Lambda Coordinates Aftermath Besides enjoying a slightly cheaper, but at the same time noticeable, computational cost when compared with the LD coordinates, the flexibility of the λ -coordinate system can improve the customary

¹ For $w = 4$, the method is described as follows. $Q_5 = Q_5 + Q_7$, $Q_3 = Q_3 + Q_5$, $Q_1 = Q_1 + Q_3$, $Q_7 = Q_7 + Q_5 + Q_3$, $Q = 2Q_7 + Q_1$, which requires six point additions and one point doubling.

scalar multiplication algorithms in other more subtle ways. For instance, in the case of the double-and-add method, the usage of the doubling and addition operation saves multiplications whenever an addition must be performed in the main loop. The speed-up comes from the variance between the costs of doubling and addition ($10\tilde{m} + 1\tilde{m}_a + 6\tilde{s}$) versus doubling and then adding the points separately ($12\tilde{m} + 1\tilde{m}_a + 6\tilde{s}$). To see the overall impact of this saving in say, the GLV double-and-add method, one has to calculate the probabilities of one, two or no additions in a loop iteration (details can be found in Appendix C). As mentioned before, it is also possible to apply the doubling and addition operation to speedup the calculation of the multiples of P in the precomputation phase. For that, we modified the original formula to perform the operation $R, S = 2Q \pm P$, which costs $16\tilde{m} + 1\tilde{m}_a + 8\tilde{s}$.

Perhaps more significantly, in the halve-and-add method there is an important multiplication saving in each one of the loop additions. This is because points in the form of $(x, x + \frac{y}{x})$ are already in the required format for the λ -mixed-addition operation and therefore, do not need to be converted to the regular affine representation.

The concrete gains obtained from the λ -projective coordinates can be better appreciated in terms of field operations. Specifically, using the 4-NAF representation of a 254-bit scalar yields the following estimated savings. The double-and-add strategy requires $872\tilde{m} + 889\tilde{s}$ (considering $\tilde{m}_b = \frac{2}{3}\tilde{m}$) or $823\tilde{m} + 610\tilde{s}$ if performed with LD or λ -coordinates, respectively. This implies a saving of 31% over the squarings and 5% in the number of multiplications. The halve-and-add needs $772\tilde{m} + 255\tilde{s}$ with LD and $721\tilde{m} + 101\tilde{s}$ with λ -coordinates, which yields 6% less multiplications and 60% less squarings. These estimations do not consider pre/postcomputation costs.

4.4 Parallel scalar multiplication

In this Section, we apply the method given in [2] for computing an scalar multiplication using two processors. The main idea is to compute $k'' \equiv 2^t k \pmod r$, with $0 < t \leq n$. This produces $k \equiv k''_{n-1} 2^{n-1-t} + \dots + k''_t 2^0 + k''_{t-1} / 2^{-1} + \dots + k''_0 2^{-t} \pmod r$, which can be rewritten as, $kP = \sum_{i=t}^{n-1} k''_i (2^{i-t} P) + \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} k''_i (\frac{1}{2^{-(t-i)}} P)$. This parallel formulation allows to compute $Q = kP$ using the double-and-add and halve-and-add concurrently, where a portion of k is processed in different cores. The constant t value depends on the performance of the scalar multiplication methods and can be found experimentally. The GLV method combined with the parallel technique is presented in Algorithm 1.

4.5 Protected scalar multiplication

Regular scalar multiplication algorithms can prevent leakage of information about the (possibly secret) scalar in the form of variable execution time. There are two main ways to make a scalar multiplication regular: one is using unified point doubling and addition formulas [8] and the other is recoding the scalar in a

Algorithm 1 Parallel scalar multiplication with GLV method

Input: $P \in E(\mathbb{F}_{2^{2m}})$, scalars k_1, k_2 of bitlength $n \approx |r|/2$, w , constant t **Output:** $Q = kP$

```

    Calculate  $w$ -NAF( $k_i$ ) for  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ 
Compute  $P_i = iP$  and  $\tilde{P}_i = \psi(P_i)$ 
for  $i \in \{1, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$ 
 $Q_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$ 
for  $i = n$  downto  $t$  do
     $Q_0 \leftarrow 2Q_0$ 
    if  $k_{1,i} > 0$  then  $Q_0 \leftarrow Q_0 + P_{k_{1,i}}$ 
    if  $k_{1,i} < 0$  then  $Q_0 \leftarrow Q_0 - P_{k_{1,i}}$ 

    if  $k_{2,i} > 0$  then  $Q_0 \leftarrow Q_0 + \tilde{P}_{k_{2,i}}$ 
    if  $k_{2,i} < 0$  then  $Q_0 \leftarrow Q_0 - \tilde{P}_{k_{2,i}}$ 
end for
{Barrier}
Recode  $k_1, k_2 \rightarrow k$ , if necessary.
return  $Q \leftarrow Q + Q_0$ 

Initialize  $Q_i \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$ 
for  $i \in \{1, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$ 
for  $i = t - 1$  downto  $0$  do
     $P \leftarrow P/2$ 
    if  $k_{1,i} > 0$  then  $Q_{k_{1,i}} \leftarrow Q_{k_{1,i}} + P$ 
    if  $k_{1,i} < 0$  then  $Q_{k_{1,i}} \leftarrow Q_{k_{1,i}} - P$ 

    if  $k_{2,i} > 0$  then  $Q_{k_{2,i}} \leftarrow Q_{k_{2,i}} + \psi(P)$ 
    if  $k_{2,i} < 0$  then  $Q_{k_{2,i}} \leftarrow Q_{k_{2,i}} - \psi(P)$ 
end for
 $Q \leftarrow \sum iQ_i$  for  $i \in \{1, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$ 
{Barrier}
```

predictable pattern [25]. Both halve-and-add and double-and-add methods can be modified in the latter manner, with the additional care that table lookups to read or write critical data need to be completed in constant-time, by performing linear passes with conditional move instructions over the accumulators or precomputed points, thwarting cache-timing attacks.

Implementing side-channel resistance usually impose significant performance penalties. For example, the density of regular recodings ($\frac{1}{w-1}$) is considerably lower than w -NAF and access to precomputed data becomes more expensive. Efficiently computing a point halving operation in constant time is specially challenging, since the fastest methods for half-trace computation require significant amounts of memory. This requirement can be relaxed if we assume that points being multiplied are public information and available to the attacker. Note however that this is a reasonable assumption in most protocols based on elliptic curves, but there are exceptions [10]. In this case, performing linear passes to read and store each accumulator Q_i still impact performance at every point addition.

Moreover, the first point addition to each accumulator $Q_i = \infty$ cannot be made faster. For these reasons, doubling-based methods seem to be a more promising option for protected implementations. Somewhat surprisingly, because of the regular recoding method and when using λ -coordinates, we can combine the formulas for mixed addition and doubling-and-addition to compute $2Q + P_i + P_j$ with cost $17\tilde{m} + 1\tilde{m}_a + 8\tilde{s}$, saving one multiplication. Reading points P_i, P_j can also be optimized by performing a single linear pass over the precomputed table. These optimizations alone are enough to compensate the performance gap between point doubling and halving.

Table 4. Timings for the field arithmetic and elliptic curve operations.

Field operation	$\mathbb{F}_{2^{127}}$		$\mathbb{F}_{2^{254}}$		Elliptic curve operation	GLS $E/\mathbb{F}_{2^{254}}$	
	cycles	op/M^1	cycles	op/M		cycles	op/M
Multiplication	42	1.00	94	1.00	Doubling	450	4.79
Mod. Reduction ²	6	0.14	11	0.12	Full-addition	1102	11.72
Square root	8	0.19	15	0.16	Mixed-addition	812	8.64
Squaring	9	0.21	13	0.14	Doubling and add.	1063	11.30
Multi-Squaring	55	1.31	n/a ³	n/a	Halving	233	2.48
Inversion	765	18.21	969	10.30	No-GLV 4-NAF rec.	1540	16.38
Half-Trace	42	1.00	60	0.64	2-GLV-4-NAF rec.	918	9.76
Trace	≈ 0	0	≈ 0	0	Reverse recoding	396	4.21

¹ Ratio to multiplication.

² This cost is included in the timings of all operations that require modular reduction.

³ Multi-Squaring is used for the inversion algorithm, which is computed only in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{127}}$.

5 Results and discussion

Our library targeted the Intel Sandy Bridge processor family. This multi-core micro-architecture supports carry-less multiplications, the SSE set of instructions [22] that operates on 128-bit registers and the AVX extension [12], which provides SIMD instructions in a three-operand format. However, our code can be easily adapted to any architecture which support the mentioned features. The benchmarking was run on an Intel Xeon E31270 3.4GHz and an Intel Core i5 3570 3.4GHz with the TurboBoost and the HyperThreading technologies disabled. The code was implemented in the C programming language, compiled with gcc 4.7.0 and executed on 64-bit Linux. Experiments with the icc 13.0 were also carried out and generated similar results. For that reason, we abstained from presenting timings for that compiler. In the next segments, we present the results of our field and point arithmetic and the scalar multiplication implementations.

5.1 Field arithmetic and elliptic curve operations

Table 4 shows that the quadratic field arithmetic can handle the base field elements with a considerable efficiency. Field inversion, squaring and square-root as well as the half-trace computational costs are just 1.27, 1.44, 1.87 and 1.43 times higher than their corresponding base field operations, respectively. Field multiplication in the quadratic field can be accomplished at a cost of about 2.23 times base field multiplications, which is significantly better than the theoretical Karatsuba ratio of three.

The lazy reduction technique was applied in order to optimize the λ -coordinate formulas. Nevertheless, experimental results showed us that this method should be used with caution. Extra savings were obtained by considering the separate case of performing mixed-addition where the two points have their Z coordinate

Table 5. Scalar multiplication timings with or without side-channel resistance (SCR).

Scalar multiplication	Curve	Security	Method	SCR	Cycles
Taverne et al. [40] ²	NIST-K233	112	No-GLV (τ -and-add)	no	67,800
Bos et al. [9] ¹	BK/FKT	128	4-GLV (double-and-add)	no	156,000
Aranha et al. [4] ²	NIST-K283	128	2-GLV (τ -and-add)	no	99,200
Longa and Sica [33] ²	GLS	128	4-GLV (double-and-add)	no	91,000
Taverne et al. [40]	NIST-K233	112	No-GLV, parallel (2 cores)	no	46,500
Longa and Sica [33]	GLS	128	4-GLV, parallel (4 cores)	no	61,000
Bernstein [6, 7] ²	Curve25519	128	Montgomery ladder	yes	194,000
Hamburg [17] ³	Montgomery	128	Montgomery ladder	yes	153,000
Longa and Sica [33]	GLS	128	4-GLV (double-and-add)	yes	137,000
Bos et al. [9]	Kummer	128	Montgomery ladder	yes	117,000
This work	GLS	128	2-GLV (double-and-add) (LD)	no	117,500
			2-GLV (double-and-add) (λ)	no	93,500
			2-GLV (halve-and-add) (LD)	no	81,800
			2-GLV (halve-and-add) (λ)	no	72,300
			2-GLV, parallel (2 cores) (λ)	no	47,900
			2-GLV (double-and-add) (λ)	yes	114,800

¹ Intel Core i7-3520M 2.89GHz (Ivy Bridge).

² Intel Core i7-2600 3.4GHz (Sandy Bridge).

³ Intel Core i7-2720QM 2.2GHz (Sandy Bridge).

equal to one. In this case, mixed addition can be performed with just five multiplications and two squarings. This observation helped us to save more than 1000 cycles in the halve-and-add algorithm computation. The reverse recoding calculation, that is, given k_1, k_2 return $k \equiv k_1 + k_2\delta \pmod r$ can be omitted if not required. However, in our scalar multiplication timings, this operation was included in all the cases. The speed-up of 40% of the 2-GLV-4-NAF against the No-GLV-4-NAF recoding is due to the elimination of half of the additions with carry performed in the scalars.

5.2 Scalar multiplication

From both algorithm analysis and experimental results considerations, we decided to use $w = 4$ for the w -NAF scalar recoding and $w = 5$ for the regular recoding of [25]. In the case of our parallel implementation (see Algorithm 1), the parameter $t = 72$ was selected, which is consistent with the 1.29 ratio between the double-and-add and halve-and-add computational costs. In addition, in our λ -coordinate system implementations, it was assumed that the points are given and returned in the λ -affine form. If the input and output points must be represented in affine coordinates, it is necessary to add about 1000 cycles ($2\tilde{m} + 1\tilde{i}$) to the timings reported in this work. Also, we observed a further 2% speedup in average when executing our code in the newer Ivy Bridge platform. Our scalar

Table 6. Characterization of the implementations by the multiplication operation

Implementations	Field	Method	Est. Multiplications		Field Mult. cost (cc)
			pre/post	sc. mult.	
Taverne et al. [40]	$\mathbb{F}_{2^{233}}$	No-GLV	92	638	100
Aranha et al. [4]	$\mathbb{F}_{2^{283}}$	2-GLV	100	572	142
Longa and Sica [33]	\mathbb{F}_{p-256}	4-GLV	113	1004	80
This Work	$\mathbb{F}_{2^{254}}$	2-GLV	86	752	94

multiplication timings, along with the state-of-the-art implementations, are presented in Table 5.

Comparison to related work Our single-core 4-NAF 2-dimensional GLV implementation achieves 72,300 clock cycles with the halve-and-add method. This result is 20% and 27% faster than the best point multiplication 128-bit security level implementations over prime [33] and binary curves [4], respectively. Furthermore, our two-core parallel implementation using the GLV technique combined with the halve-and-add and double-and-add methods takes 47,900 clock cycles, thus outperforming by 21% the timings reported in [33] for a four-core parallel implementation. Also, the single and multi-core implementations at the 112-bit security level using Koblitz binary curves reported in [40] outperforms our code in just 6% and 3%, respectively. Finally, our single-core protected multiplication is 16% faster than [33] and 4% faster than the previous speed record set by [9].

A field multiplication comparative Trying to have a fairer comparison that attenuates the diversity of curves, methods and technologies, Table 6 compares the estimated number of field multiplications required by implementations that represent the state-of-the-art of unprotected implementations of scalar multiplication computations.

The scalar multiplications on Koblitz curves reported in [40] and [4] require, 13% and 20% less number of field multiplications than our work (2-GLV halve-and-add with λ -coordinates), respectively. However, since our field multiplication cost is, 6% and 34% faster, our computational timings outperforms [4] and are competitive with [40] as seen in Table 5. This leads us to conclude that the τ -and-add method is more efficient than the halve-and-add, but the former technique suffers from the relatively limited extension fields available for Koblitz curves, which at least for the 128-bit security level case, forces to have larger field elements and thus, more expensive field multiplications.

The GLS elliptic curve over a prime field reported in [33] requires 33% more field multiplications than our code. Nevertheless, it benefits from a highly efficient native multiplication with carry instruction (MUL), which allows to generate a fast scalar multiplication. The same observation can be extended to protected implementations when comparing between prime and binary curves.

6 Conclusion

In this work, the λ -coordinates, a new projective coordinate system that enjoys fast elliptic curve operations, was presented. The use of the λ -coordinates in combination with an optimized implementation of a quadratic field arithmetic and the endomorphisms available in the GLS curves, allowed us to achieve record timings in the scalar multiplication computation for different point configurations, including the fastest reported computation of kP at the 128-bit level of security. In addition, the expected improvement of the carry-less multiplication and the announcement of the AVX2 instruction set [23] in the future Intel processors will result in a significant performance improvement of the scalar multiplication implementations presented in this work.

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A Modular Reduction Algorithms

For a better comprehension of our modular reduction algorithms, we provide in Table 7 the notation for the vector instructions. This notation is closely based on [5], but here, we use the AVX instruction set.

Table 7. Vector instructions used for the binary field arithmetic implementation

Symbol	Description	AVX
\ll_{64}, \gg_{64}	Bitwise shift of packed 64-bit integers	VPSLLQ, VPSRLQ
\oplus, \wedge, \vee	Bitwise XOR, AND, OR	VPXOR, VPAND, VPOR
\triangleright	Multi-precision shifts	VPALIGNR
$intlo_{64}, intlhi_{64}$	Packed 64-bit integers interleaving	VPUNPCKLBW, VPUNPCKHBW

For the particular irreducible trinomial $f(x) = x^{127} + x^{63} + 1$, we use the following algorithm.

Algorithm 2 Modular reduction by $f(x) = x^{127} + x^{63} + 1$

Input: 256-bit polynomial d' stored into two 128-bit registers $r_1||r_0$.

Output: \mathbb{F}_q element $d' \bmod f(x)$ stored into a 128-bit register r_0 .

$t_0 \leftarrow (r_1, r_0) \triangleright 64$	$t_0 \leftarrow t_0 \oplus r_1$
$r_1 \leftarrow r_1 \ll_{64} 1$	$r_0 \leftarrow r_0 \oplus r_1$
$r_1 \leftarrow inthi_{64}(r_1, t_0)$	$t_0 \leftarrow t_0 \gg_{64} 63$
$r_0 \leftarrow r_0 \oplus t_0$	$r_1 \leftarrow intlo_{64}(t_0, t_0)$
$r_0 \leftarrow r_0 \oplus (r_1 \ll_{64} 63)$	return r_0

This modular reduction algorithm can be improved for squaring. In this case, a^2 , with $a \in \mathbb{F}_q$, is represented using two 128-bit register $r_1||r_0$. By observing that the 63-th bit of the register r_1 is zero, the modular reduction algorithm can be optimized as shown in Alg. 3.

Algorithm 3 Modular reduction by $f(x) = x^{127} + x^{63} + 1$ for the squaring operation

Input: 256-bit polynomial a^2 stored into two 128-bit registers $r_1||r_0$.

Output: \mathbb{F}_q element $a^2 \bmod f(x)$ stored into a 128-bit register r_0 .

$t_0 \leftarrow (r_1, r_0) \triangleright 64$	$t_0 \leftarrow t_0 \oplus r_1$
$r_1 \leftarrow r_1 \ll_{64} 1$	$r_0 \leftarrow r_0 \oplus r_1$
$t_0 \leftarrow inthi(r_1, t_0)$	$r_0 \leftarrow r_0 \oplus t_0$
return r_0	

B Proofs

Proof of Theorem 1. Let $P = (x_P, \lambda_P)$ be an elliptic point in $E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F}_{2^m})$. Then a formula for $2P = (x_{2P}, \lambda_{2P})$ is given by

$$x_{2P} = \lambda_P^2 + \lambda_P + a$$

$$\lambda_{2P} = \frac{x_P^2}{x_{2P}} + \lambda_P^2 + a + 1.$$

From [20], pag. 81, we have the formulas: $x_{2P} = \lambda_P^2 + \lambda_P + a$ and $y_{2P} = x_P^2 + \lambda_P x_{2P} + x_{2P}$. Then, a formula for λ_{2P} can be obtained as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\lambda_{2P} &= \frac{y_{2P} + x_{2P}^2}{x_{2P}} = \frac{(x_P^2 + \lambda_P \cdot x_{2P} + x_{2P}) + x_{2P}^2}{x_{2P}} \\ &= \frac{x_P^2}{x_{2P}} + \lambda_P + 1 + x_{2P} = \frac{x_P^2}{x_{2P}} + \lambda_P + 1 + (\lambda_P^2 + \lambda_P + a) \\ &= \frac{x_P^2}{x_{2P}} + \lambda_P^2 + a + 1.\end{aligned}$$

In affine coordinates, the doubling formula requires one division and two squarings. Given the point $P = (X_P, L_P, Z_P)$ in the λ -projective representation, an efficient projective doubling algorithm can be derived by applying the doubling formula to the affine point $(\frac{X_P}{Z_P}, \frac{L_P}{Z_P})$. For x_{2P} we have:

$$\begin{aligned}x_{2P} &= \frac{L_P^2}{Z_P^2} + \frac{L_P}{Z_P} + a \\ &= \frac{L_P^2 + L_P \cdot Z_P + a \cdot Z_P^2}{Z_P^2} = \frac{T}{Z_P^2} = \frac{T^2}{T \cdot Z_P^2}.\end{aligned}$$

For λ_{2P} we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\lambda_{2P} &= \frac{\frac{X_P^2}{Z_P^2}}{\frac{T}{Z_P^2}} + \frac{L_P^2}{Z_P^2} + a + 1 \\ &= \frac{X_P^2 \cdot Z_P^2 + T \cdot (L_P^2 + (a+1) \cdot Z_P^2)}{T \cdot Z_P^2}.\end{aligned}$$

From the λ -projective equation, we have the relation $T \cdot X_P^2 = X_P^4 + b \cdot Z_P^4$. Then the numerator w of λ_{2P} can also be written as follows,

$$\begin{aligned}w &= X_P^2 \cdot Z_P^2 + T \cdot (L_P^2 + (a+1) \cdot Z_P^2) \\ &= X_P^2 \cdot Z_P^2 + T \cdot L_P^2 + T^2 + T^2 + (a+1) \cdot Z_{2P} \\ &= X_P^2 \cdot Z_P^2 + T \cdot L_P^2 + L_P^4 + L_P^2 \cdot Z_P^2 + a^2 \cdot Z_P^4 + T^2 + (a+1) \cdot Z_{2P} \\ &= X_P^2 \cdot Z_P^2 + T \cdot (L_P^2 + X_P^2) + X_P^4 + b \cdot Z_P^4 + L_P^4 + L_P^2 \cdot Z_P^2 + a^2 \cdot Z_P^4 + T^2 + (a+1) \cdot Z_{2P} \\ &= (L_P^2 + X_P^2) \cdot ((L_P^2 + X_P^2) + T + Z_P^2) + T^2 + (a^2 + b) \cdot Z_P^4 + (a+1) \cdot Z_{2P}.\end{aligned}$$

This completes the proof.

Proof of Theorem 2. Let $P = (x_P, \lambda_P)$ and $Q = (x_Q, \lambda_Q)$ be elliptic points in $E_{a,b}(\mathbb{F}_{2^m})$. Then a formula for $P + Q = (x_{P+Q}, \lambda_{P+Q})$ is given by

$$\begin{aligned}x_{P+Q} &= \frac{x_P \cdot x_Q}{(x_P + x_Q)^2} (\lambda_P + \lambda_Q) \\ \lambda_{P+Q} &= \frac{x_Q \cdot (x_{P+Q} + x_P)^2}{x_{P+Q} \cdot x_P} + \lambda_P + 1.\end{aligned}$$

Since P and Q are elliptic points on a non-supersingular curve, we have the following relation: $y_P^2 + x_P \cdot y_P + x_P^3 + a \cdot x_P^2 = b = y_Q^2 + x_Q \cdot y_Q + x_Q^3 + a \cdot x_Q^2$. The known formula for computing the x -coordinate of $P+Q$ is given by $x_{P+Q} = s^2 + s + x_P + x_Q + a$, where $s = \frac{y_P + y_Q}{x_P + x_Q}$. Then one can derive the new formula as follows,

$$\begin{aligned} x_{P+Q} &= \frac{(y_P + y_Q)^2 + (y_P + y_Q) \cdot (x_P + y_Q) + (x_P + x_Q)^3 + a \cdot (x_P + x_Q)^2}{(x_P + x_Q)^2} \\ &= \frac{b + b + x_Q \cdot (x_P^2 + y_P) + x_P \cdot (x_Q^2 + y_Q)}{(x_P + x_Q)^2} \\ &= \frac{x_P \cdot x_Q \cdot (\lambda_P + \lambda_Q)}{(x_P + x_Q)^2}. \end{aligned}$$

For computing λ_{P+Q} , we use the observation that the x -coordinate of $(P+Q) - P$ is x_Q . We also know that for $-P$ we have $\lambda_{-P} = \lambda_P + 1$ and $x_{-P} = x_P$. By applying the formula for the x -coordinate of $(P+Q) + (-P)$ we have

$$\begin{aligned} x_Q &= x_{(P+Q)+(-P)} = \frac{x_{P+Q} \cdot x_{-P}}{(x_{P+Q} + x_{-P})^2} \cdot (\lambda_{P+Q} + \lambda_{-P}) \\ &= \frac{x_{P+Q} \cdot x_P}{(x_{P+Q} + x_P)^2} \cdot (\lambda_{P+Q} + \lambda_P + 1). \end{aligned}$$

Then $\lambda_{P+Q} = \frac{x_Q \cdot (x_{P+Q} + x_P)^2}{x_{P+Q} \cdot x_P} + \lambda_P + 1$.

To obtain a λ -projective addition formula, we apply the formulas above to the affine points $(\frac{X_P}{Z_P}, \frac{L_P}{Z_P})$ and $(\frac{X_Q}{Z_Q}, \frac{L_Q}{Z_Q})$. Then, the x_{P+Q} coordinate of $P+Q$ can be computed as:

$$\begin{aligned} x_{P+Q} &= \frac{\frac{X_P}{Z_P} \cdot \frac{X_Q}{Z_Q} \cdot (\frac{L_P}{Z_P} + \frac{L_Q}{Z_Q})}{(\frac{X_P}{Z_P} + \frac{X_Q}{Z_Q})^2} \\ &= \frac{X_P \cdot X_Q \cdot (L_P \cdot Z_Q + L_Q \cdot Z_P)}{(X_P \cdot Z_Q + X_Q \cdot Z_P)^2} \\ &= X_P \cdot X_Q \cdot \frac{A}{B}. \end{aligned}$$

For the λ_{P+Q} coordinate of $P+Q$ we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_{P+Q} &= \frac{\frac{X_Q}{Z_Q} \cdot (\frac{X_P \cdot X_Q \cdot A}{B} + \frac{X_P}{Z_P})^2}{\frac{X_P \cdot X_Q \cdot A}{B} \cdot \frac{X_P}{Z_P}} + \frac{L_P + Z_P}{Z_P} \\ &= \frac{(A \cdot X_Q \cdot Z_P + B)^2 + (A \cdot B \cdot Z_Q)(L_P + Z_P)}{A \cdot B \cdot Z_P \cdot Z_Q}. \end{aligned}$$

In order that both x_{P+Q} and λ_{P+Q} have the same denominator, the formula for x_{P+Q} can be written as

$$X_{P+Q} = \frac{X_P \cdot X_Q \cdot A}{B} = \frac{A \cdot (X_P \cdot Z_Q) \cdot (X_Q \cdot Z_P) \cdot A}{A \cdot B \cdot Z_P \cdot Z_Q}.$$

Therefore, $x_{P+Q} = \frac{X_{P+Q}}{Z_{P+Q}}$ and $\lambda_{P+Q} = \frac{L_{P+Q}}{Z_{P+Q}}$. This completes the proof.

Proof of Theorem 3. The λ -projective formula is obtained by adding the λ -affine points $2Q = (\frac{X_{2Q}}{Z_{2Q}}, \frac{L_{2Q}}{Z_{2Q}})$ and $P = (x_P, \lambda_P)$ with the formula of Theorem 2. Then, the x coordinate of $2Q + P$ is given by

$$\begin{aligned} x_{2Q+P} &= \frac{x_{2Q} \cdot x_P}{(x_{2Q} + x_P)^2} (\lambda_{2Q} + \lambda_P) \\ &= \frac{X_{2Q} \cdot x_P (L_{2Q} + \lambda_P \cdot Z_{2Q})}{(X_{2Q} + x_P \cdot Z_{2Q})^2} \\ &= \frac{x_P \cdot (X_Q^2 \cdot Z_Q^2 + T \cdot (L_Q^2 + (a+1 + \lambda_P) \cdot Z_Q^2))}{(T + x_P \cdot Z_Q^2)^2} \\ &= x_P \cdot \frac{A}{B}. \end{aligned}$$

The λ_{2Q+P} coordinate of $2Q + P$ is computed as

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_{2Q+P} &= \frac{\frac{X_{2Q}}{Z_{2Q}} \cdot (x_P \cdot \frac{A}{B} + x_P)^2}{x_P \cdot \frac{A}{B} \cdot x_P} + \lambda_P + 1 \\ &= \frac{T \cdot (A+B)^2 + (\lambda_P + 1) \cdot (A \cdot B \cdot Z_Q^2)}{A \cdot B \cdot Z_Q^2}. \end{aligned}$$

The formula for x_{2Q+P} can be written with denominator Z_{2Q+P} as follows,

$$x_{2Q+P} = \frac{x_P \cdot A}{B} = \frac{x_P \cdot Z_Q^2 \cdot A^2}{A \cdot B \cdot Z_Q^2}.$$

Therefore, $x_{2Q+P} = \frac{X_{2Q+P}}{Z_{2Q+P}}$ and $\lambda_{2Q+P} = \frac{L_{2Q+P}}{Z_{2Q+P}}$. This completes the proof.

C Operation count for 2-GLV double-and-add using λ -coordinates

Basically, three cases can occur in the 2-GLV double-and-add main loop. The first one, when the digits of both scalars k_1, k_2 equal zero, we just perform a point doubling (D) in the accumulator. The second one, when both scalar digits are different from zero, we have to double the accumulator and sum two points. In this case, we perform one doubling and addition (DA) followed by a mixed-addition (A). Finally, it is possible that just one scalar has its digit different from zero. Here, we double the accumulator and sum a point, which can be done with only one doubling and addition operation.

Then, as the nonzero bit distributions in the scalars represented by the w -NAF are independent, we have for the first case,

$$Pr[k_{1,i} = 0 \wedge k_{2,i} = 0] = \frac{w^2}{(w+1)^2}, \text{ for } i \in [0, n-1].$$

For the second case,

$$Pr[k_{1,i} \neq 0 \wedge k_{2,i} \neq 0] = \frac{1}{(w+1)^2}, \text{ for } i \in [0, n-1].$$

And for the third case,

$$Pr[(k_{1,i} \neq 0 \wedge k_{2,i} = 0) \vee (k_{1,i} = 0 \wedge k_{2,i} \neq 0)] = \frac{2w}{(w+1)^2}.$$

Consequently, the operation count can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{n}{2} \left(\frac{w^2}{(w+1)^2} D + \frac{1}{(w+1)^2} (DA + A) + \frac{2w}{(w+1)^2} DA \right) \\ &= \frac{(2w+1)n}{2(w+1)^2} DA + \frac{w^2 n}{2(w+1)^2} D + \frac{n}{2(w+1)^2} A. \end{aligned}$$