Another look at "provable security"
Neal Koblitz and Alfred Menezes
Journal of Cryptology, 20 (2007), 3-37.
We give an informal analysis and critique of several typical "provable
security" results. In some cases there are intuitive but convincing
arguments for rejecting the conclusions suggested by the formal
terminology and "proofs," whereas in other cases the formalism seems to
be consistent with common sense. We discuss the reasons why the search
for mathematically convincing theoretical evidence to
support the security of public-key systems has been an important theme of
researchers. But we argue that the theorem-proof paradigm of theoretical
mathematics is often of limited relevance here and frequently leads to
papers that are confusing and misleading. Because our paper is aimed at
the general mathematical public, it is self-contained and as jargon-free
Journal paper Eprint paper