

- Security must be balanced against the needs of privacy.
- Security is important yes, but it must be done cognizant of Privacy needs.

Don't Ever Say Things Like
That!

Reject the Security/Privacy Dichotomy

- Law enforcement depends heavily on anonymity (only works if anonymity is trusted)
- Anonymizer.com set up link to FBI anonymous tip line from their homepage on Sept. 12, 2001
- Identity theft costs businesses, govt., and individuals a fortune
- Whistleblowers can make managers aware of security problems without fear of reprisal from immediate superiors

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Understanding Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Do More With Less

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PETs and *Beyond*

- Why should you care about magic technology?
 - It won't solve your immediate (currently foreseeable) problems
- Don't push for legislation that is responsive to some currently hot technology
By the first court case, it will be outdated
- You need to know what is possible.
 - You need to change your expectation so you can change that of the public and the policy makers.

It's hard to manage privacy information

- Worry about regulatory compliance
- Human and technology costs of protecting information

What if you don't have any information to protect?

- Answer: Then you don't have to protect that information
- Subject Access Request (SAR) debate this morning
 - If you have not collected anything . . .
 - (perhaps can even prove that you *could not* have collected anything),
then you are home free.
- Our theme: You can do more with less

- Michael Geist listed reasons why privacy is decreasing
 - workplace monitoring
 - cell phone locational data
 - wireless internet applications
 - copyright
 - lawful access
- Technology already exists to do most of these things without hurting privacy.
- Caller ID example (Bank customer called for general info)
 - shows the immediate relevance of anonymous communication technology (but it's OK Mike, I won't talk about mixes or Onion Routing).

Example: Identity management

- Microsoft Passport.
- Helps you manage all those passwords, etc.
- Microsoft is carefully protecting that information
- Microsoft is not going to use or sell your usage profile (trust them)

Lucent Personal Web Assistant (LPWA)

- Invented at Lucent in the mid nineties
- Generates usernames and passwords for all Web sites from a single username and password
- Proven cryptographically robust generation
- Stateless: Nothing is stored
- Provides single sign-on without storing any private information

Problem: Intended to Make Money

- Had alot of press when developed and then spun off in late nineties
- Used as portal, not on desktop
- Sold, died with Navipath in the Internet bust
- Is patented and languishing
- Great bit of technology that is lost to us for now.

Making Money is Hard for Decentralized Privacy Systems

- ZKS Freedom, etc. (Cf. Economics of Anonymity, FC 2003)
- Costs are lower if no centralization
- Funded by public sector (Java Anon Proxy, Onion Routing) or volunteers (Onion Routing, MixMinion, Privoxy)?

Who is *Really* Participating in your System

- Need attributes, reputation, real-world checks, credentials
- There are technologies that allow you to have these
- **But** no identification
- It's not who you are, it's what you can do.

Just collect the data you need

- A certificate that says bearer is old enough to drink rather than a drivers license
- A zero knowledge proof that you earn enough to carry a mortgage, have done so for five years, etc. rather than submitting copy of your income tax records

How do you decide when to issue a credential?

- What attributes, reputations, are needed?
- How do you measure the trust on each factor?
- – This does not need to involve identification at all

How do you protect credentials? Hardware?

- Problem for *all* credentials (not just private ones).
- Better to prove you have the private credential for “allowed to buy alcohol” than trust that the bouncer won’t remember your address from your license.
 - Again, enhancing privacy enhances security

Function Creep

- Shopping mall owner decides is-a-citizen card should get you into his stores / get you a discount.
- If an issuer's *employee* thinks you should get into the mall, may be willing to bend the rules to get you a credential
- Increased protection \Rightarrow increased value \Rightarrow Decreased security

Function creep can be subtle

- Airlines did not balk at requiring ID
 - not because they believed it did anything for security, but because it helped them control resale of nonrefundable discounted tickets

What is the Value of Privacy?

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Starting Questions

- Are people rational in reasoning about privacy?
- What about corporate valuation of privacy?
- What about governmental valuation of privacy?

A Classic Scenario

- Check off your favorite soft drinks and restaurants
 - and give your name, address, phone number, DoB, . . .
- Receive a free hamburger

- Usual conclusion: consumers are irrational
 - Claim to value privacy in surveys*
 - Seem willing to trade it for a free hamburger

*Huh?

A Consumer Measure of Privacy: Identity Theft

Hamburger	=	\$2
E(ID theft from survey)	=	$\$100K \times 10^{-9}$
E(transaction)	\approx	\$2

- Overlooks other values of identity/privacy
- Overlooks cumulative effects on value (myopic)

Corporate Measure of Privacy

- Information economy favors bundling, price discrimination
 - High fixed costs, low marginal costs
- Both approaches enhanced personalized preference information
 - Varian, Odlyzko
- Not if consumers are strategic
 - Acquisti and Varian (2001,2003)

Consumer *Cost* of Privacy

- Gellman (March 2002) consumer cost of privacy: \$ 277.90 US per year
- Included: Credit reports, caller ID, Unlisted number, Anonymizer, Junk Mail opt outs
- Not included
 - Time: Downloading Spam, Deleting Spam, Sorting Junkmail, Shredding Junkmail
 - Expected ID theft costs
 - Business overhead ID theft costs
 - Service overhead, outage, reduction from spam and DoS

All of these are about the value of privacy and/or the value of personal information

- None include intangible values (hard to model)
- Ignore dynamic nature of identity theft

Identity Theft is the Killer App of Privacy Enhancing Technology

- ID theft is not the real crime in ID theft
- Propagating ID theft is the primary problem
- It's not a secrecy compromise, it's an authentication failure
- Recognizing this we can better cope with dynamics

Cost, Prevalence of ID Theft Both Growing

(GAO Report, March 2002)

- With consumers
- In the financial services industry
- Law enforcement:
 - Agencies could give no meaningful average of either costs or number of cases
- Rough Estimates of Average
 - Investigation, Prosecution: \$10K - \$15K each per case
 - Incarceration: \$17400/inmate/year
 - Parole: \$2900/person/year

Where Are We Now?

- Some legal protections started
- Consumers should do things outlined above (careful with data, get credit reports, etc.)
- But this is analogous to telling people to watch for suspicious email attachments and not open them
 - Immediately practical, but not addressing the basic problems

Analogy: Credit Reporting Agency as Pawn Shop

- Check your report twice a year, good advice but ...
 - Like requiring you to
 1. Deposit valuables as cost of doing business
 2. Check the local pawnshops to see if your valuables were stolen/misused
- Not Fair? Credit Agencies centralized, mandated to help you correct problems, etc.

Better Analogy: Criminal Justice System as Pawn Shop

- There is no central place to check (*correct*) your record
- Little focus on reporting of false information as the problem
- Maybe unfair to pawn shops under current regulations
- Criminal identity theft: the darkest side

Get The Model Right?

- Allocate cost of ID Theft \Rightarrow knowing vulnerabilities source
- 72% of 2002 victims: no idea how thief obtained information
- Could survey convicted ID thieves
 - But these are the ones who got caught
 - They're criminals
- Situation is just too dynamic for predictive use of data

Get the Crime Right

- ID theft is integrity/authentication/reputation violation
NOT a secrecy violation
- We can better allocate cost if the libel is addressed,
not just the slander that led to the libel

Discussion

- Current allocation of costs causes us to focus on identity theft as the central crime
- Likewise squishy authentication infrastructure via nonsecrets (SIN/SSN)
- Current focus is on better handling of PII (personally identifiable information)
- Could strengthen this to, e.g., make use of SIN/SSN illegal outside govt.
- Still focused on containing information, not assigning reputation

Financial Scenario

1. I give credit to you (as Bob),
2. You default,
3. I say Bob defaulted.
 - Giving you credit was my choice not Bob's
 - If you're Bob, you should incur liability as in credit report
 - If not, I should incur liability of reporting Bob;
I'm the one who screwed up, affected Bob's reputation integrity
 - Advantage: My choice/risk to authenticate you or limit your credit
 - If I screw up, I should pay a fine
 - Insurance actuarial data gives us the cost of ID theft
 - Who should get the fine/award? The "victim"? The government?

Criminal Scenario

1. You are arrested for a crime,
2. I (e.g., local court) assign arrest to you (as Bob),
3. You abscond,
4. I say Bob absconded.
 - My report of arrest and/or absconding should be subject to penalties of wrongful arrest
 - Similarly for any agency propagating my report

Reprise: Do more with less

- This shift in understanding on ID theft means
 - Put the value/cost/incentives of transactions in right place
 - Stop sanctioning use of identifiers as authenticators
 - Whole category of privacy data drops out (SSN/SIN, driver's license, etc.)
 - It won't matter that we all know Steve Adler's Passport number is (omitted for distribution)

Reprise: Do more with less

- Technologies already exist that allow you to provide service, even highly personalized without capturing private information.
- Financial transactions, location, amazon purchase records, all can be personalized without identification using already invented technologies
- Who cares if your Tivo thinks you're gay, if it doesn't know who you are.
(Thanks to Lorrie Cranor for the example.)
- We've built it.
- We're not saying you have to come; just know what's there.

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